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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain til f -Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
EDGAR GLEN. CUDE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
9619 
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of 
grand larceny upon jury trial in the Second Judicial Dis-
trict, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, was convicted of 
grand larceny by stealing his own automobile from the 
possession of the labor lienholder. Upon a finding of guilty 
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2 
by the jury, the appellant was committed to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate period provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah contends the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, brought his car to 
Mr. Harold H. Pettigrew, operator of Harold's Auto Sales 
in Ogden, Utah on August 16, 1961 (R. 7-8). The vehicle 
would not run and had to be towed to Mr. Pettigrew's shop 
(R. 8). Upon examination of the vehicle by Mr. Pettigrew 
and Mr. Eugene Seifert, Mr. Cude was informed that the 
vehicle would require substantial repairs, including replace-
ment of the camshaft and bearings (R. 95). He was fur-
ther told that he could not be given an exact appraisal of 
the cost of repairs since the amount of repair work neces-
sary could not be ascertained until the vehicle's engine was 
torn down and examined (R. 9). Mr. Cude informed Mr. 
Pettigrew that he was going to be out of the State, in Mon-
tana, for about 30 days and that Mr. Pettigrew should do 
whatever was necessary to put the car in good condition so 
that he would have good transportation (R. 10). Mr. Petti-
grew informed Mr. Cude that from his initial appraisal the 
cost might be around $180.00, but that he could not tell 
what it would be until the engine was torn down (R. 9-10). 
Mr. Cude told Mr. Pettigrew to do whatever was necessary. 
Thereafter, Mr. Pettigrew repaired the vehicle, including 
doing several things which appeared necessary after ex-
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aming the engine ( R. 1) . The cost of the repairs was 
$345.97. On September 20, 1961, Mr. Cude returned to 
Ogden and was presented with the bill for repairs to his 
vehicle (R. 14). He made no objection to the bill (R. 70). 
He had only a few dollars on his person, and indicated that 
he would go to Salt Lake City to get the money from a 
friend to pay for the repairs to the car (R. 67, 70, 71, 78, 
80). Thereafter, Mr. Cude left. At 9 :00 p.m. that night, 
he had not returned and his car was locked up at Mr. Petti-
grew's place of business (R. 4). 
Subsequently, the night of the 20th, or the morning of 
the 21st of September, 1961, Mr. Cude returned to Mr. 
Pettigrew's business establishment and took his vehicle 
(R. 62-64). He testified that he took his car for the pur-
pose of selling it to see if he could get some money to ap-
.ply on the bill (R. 66-71). Cude at no time testified that 
he intended to return the vehicle, but rather testified that 
he intended to sell it, and intended to pay Mr. Pettigrew 
as he could. On September 23, 1961, Mr. Denny Maxwell 
was stopped,. driving the vehicle, and at that time he in-
dicated he had purchased the vehicle for $50.00 from Mr. 
Cude. He produced the registration which had not been 
negotiated. Mr. Cude admitted selling the vehicle to Mr. 
Maxwell (R. 32-38). No monies were ever paid to Mr. 
Pettigrew in satisfaction of the labor lien or debt. 
During the trial, defense counsel on direct examina-
tion asked Mr. Cude if he had ever been convicted of a 
felony, to which he replied affirmatively (R. 61). He was 
not asked the number of convictions or the nature of the 
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crimes (R. 61-62). The defense counsel also questioned 
(R. 61): 
"Q. When was the last time you were under a 
felony conviction? Either serving time, or-
" A. 1952." 
On cross-examination (R. 75), the prosecutor asked: 
"Q. Isn't it a fact that you have been con-
victed of a felony? 
"A. I admitted that. 
"Q. How many times, Mr. Cude? 
"MR. RAAT: Object, Your Honor. This is in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial to this case. 
"THE COURT: Oh, I'll hear the answer. You 
opened it up. 
"MR. NEWEY: Q. How many felonies? 
"A. Three times. 
"Q. Three times? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Tell us what the nature of the first felony 
was, Mr. Cude. 
"MR. RAAT: I object, Your Honor. This is 
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
"THE COURT: You opened it up, Mr. Raat. 
He may answer. The objection is overruled. 
MR. NEWEY: Q. What was the first felony, 
Mr. Cude? 
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"A. A statutory offense. 
"Q. What was that? 
"A. Statutory. You heard me. 
"Q. Statutory rape? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What was the next felony you were con-
victed of? 
"A. Armed robbery. 
"Q. And what was the next felony you were 
convicted of, Mr. Cude? 
"A. Armed robbery. 
"Q. Now, if I understood your testimony 
right, you say that you have been out since 1952? 
"A. I said that was the last time I was con-
victed of a felony. 
"Q. When did you last get out of the peni-
tentiary? · 
"A. In 1960." 
The appellant took exceptions to certain instructions 
given to the jury by the trial judge (R. 118, 119). Based 
on the above record, the jury returned a finding of guilty. 
The appellant contends that his conviction was based on 
error, and now seeks reversal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE AC-
CUSED, BY THE PROSECUTOR, AS TO PREV-
IOUS FELONY CONVICTIONS, THEIR NA-
TURE AND NUMBER WAS PROPER CROSS-
EXAMINATION. 
The appellant contends that the trial judge "abused 
his discretion" in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine 
appellant relative to the number and nature of his previous 
felony convictions. The appellant relies upon a statement 
extracted from State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 
2d 229 (1936), loc. cit. p. 371. The appellant has taken 
his quote from the ninth principle set out in that opinion1• 
The quotation is actually inappropos for the cited propo-
sition. What the court was actually speaking about was 
the liability of a defendant to be cross-examined on his 
criminal "acts" not amounting to a conviction, but which 
would relate to his veracity. This is obvious from the 
court's reference to rule (7), which covers that subject, 
and, further, it is obvious from the fact that rule (1) was 
not mentioned, which rule states : 
" ( 1) Any witness may be asked on cross-ex-
amination whether he has been convicted of a fel-
ony." 
It is doubtful, therefore, whether the H ougensen case 
is authority for the principle urged. However, even if it 
lThe court set out some eleven rules fo·r the guidance of the bar in cross-
examining or presenting evidence on character. 
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is concluded that the case is proper authority in this in-
stance, it is misapplied under the facts of this case. First, 
the principle urged would require a finding of abuse of 
discretion. It appears from the language of the Hougensen 
case that the court was attempting to allow the trial court, 
which has an opportunity to see and observe both the wit-
nesses and jury, broad discretion, since the court stated: 
"But we think the matter should be left to the 
sound discretion of the court * * * " 
In the instant case, defense counseP himself opened 
the matter for inquiry, and very obviously sought to limit 
implications to be drawn from the evidence to a conviction 
of one unnamed felony and, further, that since 1952 the 
accused was able to completely rehabilitate himself. This 
implication was false; and if for no other reason than to 
correct the erroneous inference that the appellant had not 
been in prison since 1952, the prosecutor was properly al-
lowed his examination. It goes without saying that the 
nature of the crime committed is of great importance in 
weighing the defendant's veracity and, consequently, in-
quiry into the nature of the crime or crimes committed 
should be allowed. McCormick, Evidence (1954), p. 90, 92. 
By the same token, where the defendant has been convicted 
of more than one felony, the effect of this "trait of char-
acter" is relevant to the weight to be accorded his testi-
mony. It may be that in a particular instance the parading 
2The fact that a defense counsel may put on evidence adverse to his case 
does not necessarily preclude a prosecutor from thereafter doing so, es-
pecially for clarification. State V. Seyboldt, 65 U. 204, 236 P. 225 
(1925); Wall, Judicial Admissions: Their Use in Criminal Trials, 53 
Jnl. of Crim. Law, Criminology and Police Science 15 (1962). 
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of a whole raft of previous convictions may become cumu-
lative and the relation to veracity be _outweighed by the 
inference of general criminality; but such could not be 
claimed in this instance, since the prosecutor did not dwell 
at any great length on the accused's convictions, and merely 
set the record straight, rebutting the obviously distorted 
picture that was left by the defense counsel. The trial 
judge himself noted the fact that defense counsel had 
opened the door, and in the exercise of sound discretion 
allowed the prosecutor fair latitude. 
Secondly, it is submitted that the appellant's conten-
tion is contrary to accepted principles of cross-examination. 
The general rules in this area are noted in 3 Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence, p. 370: 
"Since, however, the weight of the evidence as 
a factor of impeachment depends upon the charac-
ter of the crime involved in the previous conviction 
-that is, whether it involved moral turpitude or 
was merely malum prohibitum-it is held that the 
nature of the crime may be shown." 
Further, op. cit. p. 384: 
"The prosecution may show all convictions of 
the defendant, and may prove both the number and 
places of former convictions and the nature of the 
crimes involved therein." 
A similar conclusion is noted in 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, Sec. 
507c, p.411: 
"It is generally held that inquiry is not confined 
to the mere fact of conviction of some crime, but 
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the name and nature of the crime of which the wit-
ness was convicted may be brought out, * * * 
"Number of convictions. It may be shown that 
the witness has been convicted of crime several 
times." 
See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 750; McCormick, Evi-
dence, p. 89-92; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. III, Sec. 980, 985-
87. 
In State v. Crawford, 60 U. 6, 206 P. 717 ( 1922), a 
similar issue was raised before this court. The court found 
that cross-examination of an accused into the nature of a 
felony conviction was permissible. The court noted : 
"The defendant testified on his own behalf, 
and, in response to an interrogatory by his counsel, 
answered that he had been convicted of a felony. 
On cross-examination by the district attorney, de-
fendant was asked what was the charge on which 
he had been convicted. To this question his counsel 
objected, on the ground of irrelevancy and imma-
teriality. Defendant answered that the conviction 
was for robbery. It is argued that the statute of 
Utah requires that 'a witness must answer the fact 
as to a conviction for felony,' and that, when that 
question has been answered, the demands of the 
statute have been met. State v. Gottfreedson, 24 
Wash, 398, 64 Pac. 523, and State v. Strodemier, 40 
Wash, 608, 82 Pac. 915. The weight of authority, 
and, we think, the better reasoning, is that the 
jurors are entitled to know of what particular fel-
ony a witness has been convicted. The evidence of 
conviction is admissible for the purpose of affect-
ing the credibility of the witness. Some crimes in-
volve a greater degree of moral turpitude than 
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others. Some felonies are more heinous than others. 
Some convictions on felony charges affect the cred-
ibflity of witnesses much more than others." · 
In addition, the court approved cross-examination by 
the district attorney into another felony conviction of the 
defendant not admitted on direct examination, and where 
the appeal from the conviction was not final. The instant 
case gives little room for distinction. In State v. Owen, 73 
Ida. 394, 253 P. 2d 203 (1953), the Idaho Supreme Court 
was faced with a similar contention as that now made by 
the appellant. The accused on direct examination testified 
that he had been convicted of a felony. On cross-examina-
tion, the prosecutor brought out the fact that there had 
been three felony convictions and also established their 
nature. The court cited the Crawford case, supra, with 
approval and concluded: 
"We conclude that no error was committed by 
requiring the appellants to state the nature of the 
felonies for which previous convictions had been ad-
mitted." 
The same conclusion was recently affirmed in State 
v. Roderick, ______ Ida. ______ , 375 P. 2d 1005 (1962), where 
the prosecutor asked of the accused the number of felonies 
for which he had been convicted. 
Other cases from this court and other courts support 
the prosecutor's action. State v. Johnson, 76 U. 84, 287 P. 
9.09; State v.- Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d 998 (1954); State 
v. Goodloe, 144 Ore. 193, 24 P. 2d 28; Dively v. People, 
74 Colo. 268, 220 P. 991; State v. Sorrell, 85 Ariz. 173, 333 
P. 2d 1081; People v. Guiterrez, 152 Cal. 2d 115, 312 P. 2d 
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291. It is submitted that the appellant's contention is with-
out merit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
WITH RESPECT TO INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY. 
The appellant in two points in his brief has claimed 
three instructional errors of the court. The State will meet 
these claims in one point of argument. 
The appellant's first claim of error relates to the trial 
court giving the following instruction : 
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of 
the offense of grand larceny, as charged in the in-
formation, the State must prove to your satisfac-
tion, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following: 
* * * * 
"That the taking away of said automobile was 
done with the wilful, unlawful and felonious intent 
of depriving the said Harold's Auto Sales ·of its 
right, as a lienholder, to the possession of said au-
tomobile." 
The appellant contends that the court should have added 
the word "permanently" before the word "depriving." 
It is submitted that the appellant can claim no basis 
for reversal on this point for two reasons. First, it is sub-
mitted that use of the word "permanently" would require 
the jury to find a deprivation of something greater than 
the right the lienholder had, and consequently, could only 
confuse the jury. In order to put the matter clearly before 
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this court, it is essential to determine what rights the lien-
holder had. It is submitted that he has two independent 
rights. First, he has the right to receive payment for his 
labor, and, secondly, he had the right to maintain posses-
sion of the property he labored on in security for payment 
of his bill. These rights are separate and distinct, but re-
lated to the extent that payment ends the possessory right. 
Section 38-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. However, loss 
of the possessory right does not excuse payment. By the 
same reasoning, if the possessory right is interfered with 
or destroyed, payment coming some· time in the future can-
not change the fact that the lienholder lost an otherwise 
valuable right to possess the enliened property as security 
or foreclose his lien if necessary. With these distinctions 
in mind, the problem involved becomes clear. The posses-
sory right is not a right to permanent possession of the 
liened property, but rather the right is a temporary one, 
conditioned upon payment. Under the provisions of Sec-
tion 38-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the lienholder only 
has a right to retain the property for the period until the 
labor debt is satisfied. As a consequence, an instruction 
which would require the jury to find a permanent inter-
ference with possession is misleading since the right of 
possession is conditional and temporary. There is a distinc-
tion between the conditional right of the lienholder and 
the fee right of the owner. Each is different and as a con-
sequence makes a difference in the intent required in lar-
ceny of such interests. Perkins, Criminal Law, (1958) p. 
224, notes the distinction and states : 
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"The common statement is that the intent to 
steal-or animus furandi, to use the Latin substi-
tute-requires an intent to deprive the owner per-
manently of his property. This conveys the idea in 
a general way but requires some explanation. Men-
tion has been made of the possibility of larceny com-
mitted by the owner himself, by taking possession 
from another for the purpose of defeating a prop-
erty right of the possessor. Hence it must be under-
stood that an intent to deprive a possessor of the 
benefit of a property right he has by reason of his 
possession may be sufficient for the intent to steal." 
The real problem is obviously what is the requisite mens 
rea. The answer is: to destroy the lienholder's possessory 
right to the property for the period for which he is entitled 
to possession. State v. Parker, 104 U. 23, 137 P. 2d 626 
( 1943) . When this principle is compared to the instruction 
given by the court, it appears that the jury was sufficiently 
appraised of the requisite intent. The requested instruc-
tion of the appellant would have been misleading and con-
fusing, which rendered the instruction improper. State v. 
Hougensen, supra. The court possibly might have been 
more precise in the instructions given by stating that the 
jury must find that the appellant intended to deprive the 
owner of his possessory interest as security for payment 
for as long as the lienholder was entitled to such security, 
but it is doubtful if this would be any-the-more compre-
hensible to the jury than the instruction given. However, 
one thing is certain, that the requested instruction was not 
sufficiently definite as to require the court to present it 
to the jury, and no error could be claimed from the failure 
to do so. 
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Additionally, it is submitted that another substantial 
reason exists why no error can be claimed by appellant. 
It is simply that there was no evidence before the jury 
that would warrant their finding an intention to return 
the res. Appellant's testimony, and judicial admission, was 
that he took the automobile to sell it to satisfy the debt. 
Thus, he never intended to allow the lienholder to regain 
his possessory interest, and can claim no error from a 
failure of the trial court to be more definitive in this area. 
The error of the appellant's defense was to conclude that 
the intent to pay could absolve him from the interference 
with the possessory security interest. As seen above, the 
possessory interest is a right in addition to the right to 
request payment, although allied thereto. Since no evidence 
was before the jury as to an intended limited deprivation 
of the possessory interest, and since the judicial admissions 
of the appellant show an intent to sell, thus depriving the 
lienholder of his possessory interest3 the jury could have 
found no other way than against the appellant. The 
appellant, therefore, could not conceivably claim any 
prejudice. Since Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, requires this court to weigh for specific substantial 
prejudice, no basis for reversal can be claimed in its ab-
sence. In State v. Anderson, 100 U. 468, 116 P. 2d 398 
(1941), this court noted: 
"* * * The instructions objectionable as 
they are nevertheless covered the issues and the evi-
dence. Under the evidence the jury were justified 
in finding the verdict of guilty. The objectionable 
3The question of whether after sale the lien would continue as against a 
third person purchaser is not before the co:urt. 
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instructions given or those requested and refused 
could not as we view the matter have changed the 
result." 
The recited principle is equally applicable to the instant 
case, since, in view of the appellant's judicial admissions, 
no other instruction could have changed the result and con-
sequently no prejudice can be claimed4 • 
Appellant' second contention is that the court erred 
by instructing the jury that certain facts had been estab-
lished ( R. 112) . This the court did not do. It instructed 
the jury that they had to find certain facts beyond a rea-
sonable doubt or else acquit. All the court did was to in-
struct the jury with reference to the evidence before them. 
It merely tailored the instructions to meet the evidence. 
This is a far cry from instructing a jury that certain facts 
are "established beyond controversy," which was the com-
plaint made in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177 
(1931). In many cases, this court has directed that the 
court tailor its instructions for the jury, based on the evi-
dence before them. Thus, in State v. Aures, 102 U. 113, 
127 P. 2d 872 (1942), the court approved of instructions 
that were stated to the specific facts and testimony of the 
case, similar to those given in this case. Thus, the court 
noted: 
"Instruction No. 7 was properly given, as such 
instruction went to testimony given at trial." 
4The State submits that since the definition of larceny under the Utah stat~ 
ute contains no reference to "permanency", such is not a part of Utah law 
so long as the taking is otherwise "felonious." This is obvious, since the 
only degrees of larceny are grand and petty, and no reference is made to a 
temporary taking-wrongful appropriation. However, since the matter 
need not be decided, the issue may be reserved until neces6ary fu.r decision. 
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In State v. BeBee, 110 U. 484, 175 P. 2d 478 (1946), 
this court stated: 
"* * * we emphasize that the court should 
apply the law to the facts of the case as they appear 
in the evidence * * * " 
In the BeBee case, the court called attention to the decision 
of State v. Thompson, 110 U. 131, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946), 
wherein the court directed trial judges to do what was done 
in the instant case. The court said : 
"Defendant urges that the court erred in giving 
general abstract instructions, using ancient and 
highly technical legal terms not understood by lay-
men, giving instructions which had no application 
to the facts in this case, and in not applying the 
law to the facts which were supported by the evi-
dence, and that the jury was probably misled there-
by and the case should be reversed on that account. 
We have repeatedly criticized the giving of abstract 
statements of the law to the jury, and held that it 
is the duty of the court to apply the law to the 
facts supported by the evidence and to not instruct 
on any question which is not involved in the case 
under the evidence. * * * (Cases cited.) We 
think that it cannot be too strongly emphasized that 
the court should apply the law to the facts as they 
appear from the evidence, and should instruct only 
on the law which has a bearing on facts, and in 
stating the necessary elements to constitute the 
crime charged it should submit to the jury the facts 
involved in the case and not merely generalizations, 
and where possible should avoid the use of technical 
legal terms and cumbersome definitions thereof, by 
using terms which will readily be understood by 
laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a much 
clearer understanding of its problems." 
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A similar conclusion has been reached by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, State v. Phillips, 42 Wash. 2d 137, 253 
P. 2d 919. Abbott Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 
668, states: 
"The charge and instructions, whether given 
by the court of its own motion or upon request, 
should be so framed as to conform to the facts in 
evidence." 
No error can be claimed from the court's instructions based 
on the evidence and testimony received at trial where the 
jury was still allowed to find as it pleased. 
Finally, the appellant contends that it was error not 
to give the following instruction (R. 19) : 
"In theft by larceny, the felonious intent that 
I have mentioned must exist when possession of the 
property is originally obtained by the person not 
entitled thereto, and it is not larceny to take prop-
erty of another through mistake or under an hon-
estly entertained claim of ownership or right to 
possession.'' 
The trial court apparently refused the instruction on 
the grounds that its substantive content was otherwise ade-
quately "covered" by other instructions. The appellant ap-
parently contends that the court's failure to so instruct 
ignored an issue or an affirmative defense. In both re-
spects, the contention is erroneous. The court instructed 
the jury as follows (R. 112) : 
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of 
the offense of grand larceny, * * * the State 
must prove to your satisfaction, 
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"* * * That the taking away of said auto-
mobile was done with the wilful, unlawful and fel-
onious intent of depriving the said Harold's Auto 
Sales of its right as a lienholder to the possession 
of said automobile." 
The court further instructed the jury that (R. 112) : 
"'Felonious' means proceeding from an evil 
heart or purpose, done with a deliberate purpose to 
commit a crime. A malicious wrongful act." 
The jury was, consequently, fully instructed on the 
intent that the accused had to possess in order to be con-
victed of the crime. It is generally recognized that the 
court need not give a requested instruction· in the language 
of its proponent. Thus, Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 
4th Ed., Sec. 663, notes the rule: 
"So, too, as a general rule, the court is not 
obliged to give requested instructions in the lan-
guage precisely as framed and submitted, however 
correct they may be; but he may, in lieu thereof, 
give instructions prepared by himself, covering, as 
he views the case, all the questions of law presented 
upon which it is necessary and advisable to instruct 
the jury, * * * " 
In State v. Chadwick, 7 U. 134, 25 P. 737 (1891), the 
Territorial Supreme Court recognized the above rule. In 
that case, the trial court instructed the jury as to what it 
would affirmatively have to find to convict the defendant 
of larceny. The defendant had proposed another instruc-
tion on the same aspect of the case. The court found no 
error in refusing the instruction, stating: 
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"While the above instruction was not given in 
the language of the learned counsel presenting 
them, yet it embodies the substance of the request, 
and leaves the question to the jury as a circum-
stance for them to consider, and to say whether, 
under all the facts and circumstances shown, pos-
session of stolen property was evidence of guilt or 
not; and at the same time the court instructed the 
jury that possession alone is not sufficient evidence 
upon which to convict. These instructions were 
given with reference to the proofs before them at 
the time, which the jury must have understood and 
applied with reference to such facts of possession 
as were shown; and, while the instruction was not 
as full and explicit as it might have been, yet it 
sufficiently covered the question presented." (7 
Utah at 140.) 
In State v. Campbell, 116 U. 74, 208 P. 2d 530 (1949), 
the court again recognized the rule, noting : 
"The court did not give the instruction desired 
by the defense in the form so requested; but he did 
define the greater and the lesser offense each in 
detail, and pointed out that the latter was included 
in the former. He then instructed the jury to con-
sider, first, the greater offense and its elements; 
and if the State failed to prove any one or more of 
the elements of that offense .beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then the jury should consider the lesser 
offense. The Court followed this with an instruc-
tion that if the State failed to prove any one or 
more of the elements of this offense, then they 
should acquit defendant. Although not stated in 
its exact words, the jury could not apply the in-
structions given without applying the requirements 
of Section 105-32-5, quoted." (116 Utah at 82.) 
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In the instant case, the requested instruction of the 
appellant went to the theory of claim of right. However, 
neither mistake nor claim of right are affirmative defenses, 
but are matters that go to the question of whether the de-
fendant had the required mens rea. State v. Parker, supra. 
This is not a situation where an affirmative defense such 
as self-defense, necessity, or insanity are involved. The 
taking under a claim of right or belief of legality only neg-
atives the "felonious intent" required as an element of 
larceny. A clear statement of the defense is contained in 
"The Claim of Right as a Defense to Theft Cases," 4 Utah 
L.Rev.528, (1954): 
"The elements of intent is a material consider-
ation in all areas of the criminal law. In the field 
of theft offenses, the claim of right is of consider-
able importance in determining the existence of the 
required criminal intent. 
* * * 
"* * * With these factors in mind, the 
courts have held that if the taking is open and 
avowed and under a good faith claim of title, the 
intent necessary to justify a theft conviction is lack-
ing." (Emphasis added.) 
Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., Gen. Part, p. 322 
(1961), notes: 
"Claim of right in larceny, as elsewhere, covers 
not only mistake of law but mistake of fact, but 
with the latter the present discussion is not primar-
ily concerned. Either kind of mistake shows that 
the taking was without the requisite intent." (Em-
phasis added.) 
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Keeping this concept in mind, it becomes clear that 
the only difference between the instruction given by the 
court and that requested by the appellant was that the 
former instructed the jury, affirmatively, as to what it 
must find to convict, and the latter would instruct, nega-
tively, as to what would diminish the required intent. It 
is clear then that the instructions given by the court ade-
quately covered the issue, and the jury could not have fol-
lowed the instructions as given and convicted if it found, 
as the appellant asserted, that he took his automobile under 
a mistaken claim of right. 
Additionally, it is submitted that the requested in-
struction was misleading and for such reason the court 
properly refused to give it. As was noted above, the con-
cept of claim of right is not an affir1native defense, but 
negatives intent. Th_e instruction proposed by the appellant 
is couched in language as though a claim of right were an 
absolute defense. The proposed instruction did not ap-
praise the jury that they should consider the nature and 
circumstances of the claim in determining whether the ap-
pellant had the required intent. R. v. Boden, 17 4 E. R. 
863 (1844); Dominion v. Shymkowich, S. C. R. 606, Sup. 
Ct. of Canada (1954). Consequently, no claim of error can 
be justified. 
Finally, it is submitted that reversal for instructional 
error would only be warranted if the instructions, when 
taken as a whole, failed to adequately appraise the jury. 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 669. The 
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instructions, when viewed as a whole clearly show that the 
jury was fairly appraised as to the issues of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal issues raised on appeal show that no basis 
for a claim of error which would warrant this court in 
reversing has been made out. Appellant's extraneous ref-
erences to a police decision that this case was civil in na-
ture are more than offset by the surreptitious and felonious 
actions of appellant, the jury's verdict, and the judge's 
sentence. This court has no other reasonable alternative 
but to affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
